Digital Networks Act: Rewiring Europe's Telecoms

The European Electronic Communications Code (Directive 2018/1972) was transposed into 27 different national frameworks, with full transposition completed only in August 2024. This fragmentation prevents scale, discourages cross-border investment, and keeps European telecoms operators far smaller than their American and Asian counterparts. The Draghi Report on EU competitiveness identified telecoms consolidation as a strategic priority.

Despite strong fibre deployment, EU 5G adoption remains critically low. The Digital Decade targets for 2030 require gigabit connectivity for all households and 5G coverage in all populated areas, goals that the current fragmented framework cannot deliver.

The DNA establishes a binding framework for decommissioning legacy copper networks. Operators must notify the national regulatory authority (NRA) and affected access seekers at least 36 months before switch-off. Alternative fibre or wireless infrastructure must be available at the point of decommissioning. Spain and Norway have already begun copper phase-out programmes. Full copper switch-off must be completed by 2039 at the latest, with the primary deadline set at 2035 for most networks.

The DNA replaces short-term national spectrum licences with authorisations of unlimited duration, subject to a minimum term of 40 years. This gives operators the investment certainty needed for large-scale network rollout. The Commission gains a veto power over national spectrum decisions that could fragment the single market.

Spectrum holders who fail to deploy within a reasonable timeframe must make unused spectrum available to other operators. The Commission will adopt binding spectrum roadmaps setting out harmonised timelines for the assignment and use of key frequency bands across all Member States.

The DNA creates a centralised EU authorisation regime for satellite operators. Instead of obtaining separate licences in each Member State, a satellite operator will apply to the Commission, which manages all stages of the authorisation process. Non-compliance may result in fines of up to 5% of global turnover. The Radio Spectrum Policy Board (RSPB) and the Office for Digital Networks (ODN) will support the Commission in this process.

Part II of the DNA formalises the phase-out of high-risk suppliers from European networks. This primarily targets Huawei and ZTE equipment, with an estimated replacement cost of EUR 3.4 to 4.3 billion per year. Mobile network operators will have a 3-year timeline to remove HRS equipment from their core and radio access networks. The rules align with the Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2) framework.

BEREC will develop a Union Preparedness Plan for electronic communications networks, coordinating resilience measures across Member States. This includes cyber incident response protocols, supply chain diversification requirements, and emergency communication fallback systems.

The DNA replaces 27 separate national authorisation regimes with a single EU-wide general authorisation, or "single passport". Operators will register once with the Office for Digital Networks (ODN), which maintains a central database of all authorised providers. The approach follows a maximum list principle: the conditions attached to the general authorisation are exhaustively defined at EU level, preventing Member States from adding additional national requirements.

The DNA maintains a sequential approach to SMP regulation: national regulatory authorities first assess whether an operator holds significant market power, then impose proportionate remedies. The Commission's veto power is expanded to cover not only proposed market definitions but also proposed remedies. A new EU-harmonised access product will standardise wholesale access conditions across Member States.

The regulation introduces provisions for fibre unbundling, allowing alternative operators to access the last mile of fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks. Symmetric regulation may be imposed on all operators regardless of market power where justified by specific bottleneck situations, such as access to in-building wiring or ducts.

The DNA preserves the core principles of the Open Internet Regulation (2015/2120). All internet traffic continues to be treated equally, with no paid prioritisation for consumer internet access services. Network slicing is explicitly permitted for B2B specialised services, allowing operators to offer guaranteed quality-of-service levels for enterprise applications.

The DNA does NOT introduce a mandatory "fair share" contribution from large traffic generators (such as streaming platforms). Instead, it creates a voluntary conciliation mechanism through which telecoms operators and content providers can negotiate commercial agreements on traffic management and infrastructure investment. This represents a compromise following intense lobbying from both sides.

Unlike the EECC directive, which allowed Member States to maintain higher consumer protection standards, the DNA adopts a maximum harmonisation approach. This means consumer rights and obligations are defined at EU level and Member States cannot deviate from them. Anti-fraud measures are centralised via the ODN, including a shared database of known fraudulent numbers and calling patterns.

Emergency services access is extended to internet-based communications services such as WhatsApp, ensuring that emergency calls can be made through number-independent interpersonal communications services. The universal service obligation (USO) is streamlined and adapted to the fibre era, removing outdated references to public payphones and printed directories.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on digital infrastructure and technological sovereignty setting out its priorities ahead of the DNA proposal. Key paragraphs called for a progressive copper switch-off with adequate transition support, increased 5G and 6G investment incentives, harmonised spectrum assignment across the EU, common EU licences for satellite communications, and a binding high-risk vendor toolbox making the voluntary 5G toolbox legally enforceable. The resolution also urged the Commission to avoid a mandatory "fair share" mechanism for traffic generators.

One week after tabling the proposal, Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen presented the Digital Networks Act and the parallel Cybersecurity Act to ITRE in a 50-minute exchange of views. This was a Commission presentation and question-and-answer session, not a rapporteur's report: the ITRE rapporteur, Renew's Michał Kobosko, was appointed four weeks later, on 26 February 2026. On the DNA, Virkkunen stressed a single regulation replacing four telecoms instruments; a single authorisation passport for operators active in several Member States; stronger EU coordination of spectrum, with priority for operators that invest and unlimited-duration licences for long-term certainty; an EU-level satellite authorisation; a copper switch-off beginning in 2030 and mandatory after 2035 except where fibre is not feasible; removal of reporting and most business-to-business authorisations; and a new EU Preparedness Plan, with the BEREC office becoming the Office for Digital Networks. She described the file as "around 200 articles and 400 recitals" and tied it to the revised Cybersecurity Act (a mandatory 5G toolbox, a strengthened ENISA and ICT supply-chain de-risking).

Commission replies. Virkkunen said first Council feedback on the package was "quite positive", and that the hardest DNA issue will be the very different situations and cultures across Member States (city centres versus remote areas). On investment she pointed to harmonised spectrum rules, investor priority and unlimited licences, and the single passport. On interconnection and net neutrality she said broad consultations showed the market "is working well", so the Commission will not regulate business-to-business contracts but offers a voluntary mechanism plus EU guidelines as a backstop, while keeping the net-neutrality principle and adapting it to 5G and 6G network slicing. On ex-ante she confirmed the general architecture and symmetric access are kept but updated to support fibre through in-house-wiring access. On security she set out NIS2-sector risk assessments (connected cars, energy and solar inverters, medical devices), a mandatory 5G toolbox with a three-year transition that excludes high-risk vendors from key 5G parts, and case-by-case mitigations (including data localisation) paired with impact assessments. She flagged the spring tech-sovereignty package (Cloud and AI Development Act, CHIPS Act 2, open-source strategy) as the next ITRE workstream.